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Abstract
Gravity models have been widely used in expanded gaming debates
to persuade investors that proposed casinos will be financially successful
and to persuade state and local government officials, as well as a skeptical
public, of the economic and fiscal benefits of casino gaming. However,
most people involved in the decision-making process understand very
little about the internal mechanics of these models and how they generate
financial forecasts, estimates of customer visits, and projections of new job
creation. In fact, the gravity models used in market feasibility studies for
the casino industry are proprietary models that remain closely guarded
secrets of the industry and its consultants. The purpose of this article is
to open the use of gravity models to critical scrutiny by reviewing their
origins, development, and limitations. A second purpose is to illustrate
our main thesis by analyzing gravity models deployed in the New England
expanded gaming debates. The authors offer a proposed modification to the
calculation of gravity factors to account for the growing importance of nongaming amenities.
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The Basic Facts of Expanding Gaming
In the United States today, there are 492 commercial casinos and
448 Indian casinos hosted by 37 states as compared to less than half that
number of casinos in two states in 1988 (AGA, 2013). However, after
twenty-five years of expanded gaming legislation at both the state and
federal levels, nearly half (46%) of all commercial casinos are now located
in non-traditional jurisdictions (i.e., outside Nevada and New Jersey) and,
if one includes Indian casinos, then seventy-two percent (72%) of all U.S.
casinos are now located in non-traditional jurisdictions (AGA, 2012, pp.
12-22; Meister, 2012, pp. 15, 73). The percentage of adults who gambled
at a casino at least once in the previous year climbed from 17 percent in
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1990 to 32 percent in 2012, when 76.1 million Americans made more than
400 million visits to casinos (Harrah’s, 2006; AGA, 2013, p. 3). Moreover,
since the early 1990s, when new casinos began opening in non-traditional
jurisdictions, nearly 82 percent of the increase in casino visitations has
occurred in non-traditional casino jurisdictions, which now also account
for 49 percent of casino gross gaming revenues (GGR) nationally. If Class
III Indian casinos are factored into the equation, non-traditional venues
now account for 69 percent of casino GGR nationally (AGA, 2012, pp. 1222; Meister, 2012, pp. 15, 73).
During this time, the debates over expanded gaming from state to
state have been remarkably similar because its proponents have offered
the same two rationales for policy change in every jurisdiction: new tax
revenues and economic development (i.e., jobs) (Evart, Treptow, and Zeitz,
1997, p. 425). The same two rationales structure debates about individual
casino projects regardless of their type or location. Casino revenue and
operating forecasts, as well as projections of new job creation, are normally
based on market feasibility studies that depend on gravity models.
Government officials want to know how much tax revenue proposed
casinos will generate, while citizens want to know how many and what
types of new jobs will be created by a casino. Chambers of commerce and
restaurant associations are often concerned about the potential impact of
casinos on the local lodging, food and beverage, and retail sectors. Tourism
officials, and other segments of the hospitality industry, demand reliable
estimates of the number of out-of-region visitors that can be generated by
casinos and how many visits and what type of spending will occur each
year as a result of those visits.
Thus, one purpose of gravity models has been to provide investors
with an evaluation of specific sites for proposed business establishments
and to determine the potential sales of the proposed establishments within
a reasonable range of error, which allows investors to assess the probability
that the proposed casino will be financially successful. A second practical
use of gravity models has been to provide investors with empirically based
research that allows them to identify the best location among alternative
possible locations for particular casinos, with the “best” location being
the one that “will produce for the firm an optimum share of the market
potential, a minimum hazard for future sales erosion, and a maximum
return on total investment over the long-run” (Applebaum, 1965, p. 235).
A third use that is not unique to the casino industry is persuading state and
local government officials, as well as a skeptical public, of the economic and
fiscal benefits of expanded casino gaming.
However, John Williams (1997, p. 402) observes that outside of
Nevada and New Jersey, where casinos have operated in fairly well-defined
markets, any “feasibility study requires an intuitive leap from the known
into the unknown,” because “there is no magic formula by which you
add A, B and C and reach X as a casino’s performance.” Yet, this is exactly
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the function of gravity models in market feasibility studies, even though
most people involved in the decision-making process understand very
little about the inputs to a gravity model and much less about the internal
mechanics of these models and how they generate financial forecasts and
estimates of customer visits (Hashimoto and Fenich, 2007, p. 47). In fact,
scholars have often criticized gravity models as a black box (Bucklin, 1971,
p. 490) – one can observe what goes in and what comes out – but not how
inputs are converted into outputs. Despite this theoretical criticism, gravity
models continue to be utilized and refined by private consultants and
university scholars primarily on pragmatic grounds, i.e., because they seem
to generate reasonably accurate revenue forecasts that public and private
decision-makers find persuasive (Huff, 1963, p. 81; Evenett and Keller,
2002).
The gravity models used in most market feasibility studies for
the casino industry are proprietary models that remain closely guarded
secrets of the industry and its consultants. For instance, the International
Gaming Institute (IGI, 1996) at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas
(UNLV) published one of the first introductory overviews of the post-Las
Vegas/Atlantic City casino industry in 1996 following the rapid expansion
of riverboat and dockside gaming in the Mississippi River states and the
introduction of racetrack casinos in the Northeast. This introduction to
“the gaming industry” covered the historical background, economics,
operations, and management of casinos, but without any mention of the
role that market feasibility studies had played in each state’s expanded
gaming debates.
John Williams (1997, p. 402), who was one of the first to discuss
this issue in the newly emerging gambling studies literature offered a
generic discussion of the importance of market feasibility studies, but
“without going into detail about all the methods of homing in on a market.”
Similarly, and more recently, Douglas Walker’s (2007, pp. 5-34) highly
respected The Economics of Casino Gambling examines the relationship
between casino gaming and economic growth, including an extensive
analysis of various methodological debates, but the book does not contain
a single reference to gravity models and this omission is replicated in
Walker’s Casinonomics: The Socioeconomic Impacts of the Casino Industry
(2013). Likewise, Kathryn Hashimoto’s recent book on Casino Marketing
(2010, pp. 16-21, 41) discusses the role of strategic planning and consumer
behavior in casino marketing, but it does not discuss the role of gravity
models in initial revenue forecasting or their importance to the industry’s
business and political practices.
In fact, a JSTOR search of journals in business, economics, finance,
management, marketing, and transportation studies found exactly one
published reference to the use of gravity models in gambling studies
since 1931 (the origin of the gravity model) despite there being 367 total
references in the academic literature to the use of gravity models in other
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industries. A Google.com key word search discovered one PowerPoint
presentation delivered at the13th International Conference on Gambling
and Risk Taking (Cummings, 2006). Nevertheless, during the last twentyfive years, gravity models have played a prominent role in persuading
public officials to authorize expanded gaming in the United States, and
elsewhere, and they have supported private decisions by casino operators,
banks, and other financial institutions to invest in expanded gaming at
various locations.
Thus, the purpose of this article is to open the use of gravity
models to critical scrutiny by reviewing their origins, development, and
limitations, particularly in light of recent changes in the casino industry. A
second purpose is to point out the limitations of current gravity models in
evaluating contemporary gaming markets and to propose a modification to
the so-called gravity factor used in these models so they better account for
the growing importance of non-gaming amenities.
Reilly’s Law of Retail Gravitation
The gravity model is a tool first developed by economists in the
late 1920s and early 1930s for the purpose of estimating retail trade flows
between various geographic areas, although private retail companies
quickly recognized their utility for estimating the potential customer
base and future annual sales of new stores. Gravity models are actually
derived from Sir Isaac Newton’s Law of Gravitation, which was first used
to predict the movement of people, commodities, and sales by William J.
Reilly, a professor of business at the University of Texas.1 Reilly published
The Law of Retail Gravitation in 1931 after he realized that Newton’s Law
of Gravitation seemed to loosely express the empirical regularities he
observed while conducting several trading area investigations for chain
grocery stores in Texas during the late 1920s (Reilly, 1929).2
Newton’s Law of Gravitation, which was first articulated in his
Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687) states that the gravitational
force between two masses is proportional to the product of the two masses
and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.
Reilly argued that Newton’s Law of Gravitation seemed to provide a good
working hypothesis for defining the boundaries of competing retail trade
areas if one translated the law into two behavioral concepts: (a) that the
ability of a city to attract non-resident trade is a function of its population
(mass) and (b) that the flow of nonresident trade to a city is an inverse
function of distance (force) (Thompson, 1967, p. 37). If one adopted this
hypothesis, then the law of retail gravitation could be used to calculate
the “breaking point” between two places, where customers will be drawn
to one or another of two competing commercial centers (Anas, 1987, pp.
45-54; Golledge and Timmermans, 1988). In this sense, Reilly argued
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that “two cities attract retail trade from an intermediate city or town in the
vicinity of the breaking point approximately in direct proportion to the
populations of the two cities and in inverse proportion to the square of the
distances from the two cities to the intermediate town” (Huff, 1963, pp.
81-82), although notably, Reilly’s formulation of the law presumes that the
geography of an area is flat without any rivers, roads, or mountains to alter a
consumer’s decision about where to travel to purchase a particular good or
service.
Reilly’s Law remained an interesting hypothesis for more than a
decade and, as late as 1944, the editor of The Journal of Marketing, which
became a key academic testing ground for Reilly’s Law, wrote that “there
is a real need for inductive studies of consumer buying habits” (quoted in
Bennett, 1944, p. 405). Professor Victor W. Bennett published one of the
first studies of this type based on a survey of 240 families living in Laurel,
Maryland. The families were questioned on their choice of shopping
venues in Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C. and, in one of the
first empirical tests of Reilly’s Law, Bennett (1944, p. 413) found that “there
is more out-of-town buying by Laurel consumers in Baltimore than in
Washington, [which] conforms roughly to the application of Reilly’s Law.”
Bennett’s study was followed by the noteworthy work of P.D.
Converse (1943; 1946; 1948), a professor of business at the University
of Illinois, who examined retail customer movement between several
communities in Illinois and established the usefulness of Reilly’s Law for
defining retail trade areas across a much larger geographic area. However,
Converse (1949) made a significant addition to Reilly’s Law that more
precisely determined the breaking point between competing trading areas
centered in two different cities. Converse defined the breaking point between
two trading areas as an equilibrium boundary line where Ba = Bb, i.e., the
point up to which one city exercises a dominant trading influence and
beyond which another city dominates. The mathematical version of this
adaptation is:
(Equation 1)
				
Bab =

Dab
________
1 + √Pa/Pb

Where
		Bab = the breaking point between city A and city B
			
in miles from B
Dab = the distance separating city A from city B
Pa = the population of city A; and
Pb = the population of city B
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This breakthrough was followed by the work of Frank Strohkarck
and Katherine Phelps, who were working for the Curtis Publishing
Company. They authored a 1948 article on the mechanics of constructing
a trade area map that for the first time visually represented competing
trade areas as a series of concentric and overlapping circles emanating
from central places much like the three dimensional topographical or
contour maps familiar to geographers. Thus, Strohkarck and Phelps added
an important cartographic dimension to the gravity model as well as a
mathematical refinement of the breaking point concept.
The pioneering work of Strohkarck and Phelps was further refined by
Edna Douglas (1949a; 1949b), who employed three methods for identifying
retail customer origins in Charlotte, North Carolina: (1) the records of
the Credit Bureau of the Charlotte Merchants’ Association to determine
customer’s addresses, (2) checks deposited during one week by a group of
local retail stores to determine the location of the banks against which they
were drawn and (3) an origin-destination study of passenger cars leaving
Charlotte. Douglas’s (1949b, p. 60) findings reinforced previous studies and
again found that “Reilly’s law of retail gravitation provides a remarkably
accurate delineation of the Charlotte retail trading area.” However, Douglas’s
empirical findings also suggested a slight modification to Strohkarck’s and
Phelps’ concept of concentric market areas.
First, Douglas (1949b, pp. 59-60) found that the retail trading
area was not a single concentric circle with one breaking point, but a
series of circles within circles that comprised primary, secondary, and
tertiary market areas, with customers in the tertiary market coming from
otherwise significant trading areas that were in competition with Charlotte.
This led Douglas to conclude that market breaking points were not hard
boundaries, where all the potential customers on one side gravitated in one
direction and all of those on the other side gravitated in the other direction,
but porous boundaries that delineated points where an exponentially
decreasing proportion of customers would be drawn to a trading area. In
this formulation, the Strohkarck and Phelps breaking point formula defines
the outer boundary of a primary market area at which point the proportion
of customers attracted to a trading area begins to decline exponentially,
while the tertiary market area marks another point of exponential decline in
customer attraction (force), because the gravitational pull of a competing,
but closer trading area begins to exert greater force on customers. Douglas
also found that the primary market area was indeed nearly circular as
hypothesized by Strohkarck and Phelps, but the secondary market area
became somewhat elliptical, while the boundaries of the tertiary market area
were quite erratic depending upon the level of competition from outlying
areas with significant trading centers.
The next major advance in gravity modeling was stimulated by
the emergence of regional shopping centers (i.e., malls). By the 1950s, the
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investors in costly real estate projects, such as banks, insurance companies,
and other financial institutions, were no longer willing to rely on the
intuition of business entrepreneurs for making decisions, but increasingly
sought to base investment decisions on solid factual information as to the
profitability of a proposed real estate investment. Similarly, prospective store
tenants, often the large retail chains that were being asked to anchor the
new shopping centers, conducted their own studies to evaluate proposed
shopping center locations. This second generation of trade area studies
incorporated concepts and research techniques from marketing, geography,
statistics, economics and the behavioral science disciplines (e.g., psychology
and sociology) (Applebaum, 1965, p. 234). By the mid-1950s, this type of
gravity model was being applied to both inter-urban and intra-urban market
areas for the purpose of determining the market feasibility of local malls,
large chain stores, and regional shopping centers (Ellwood, 1954) and by
the 1960s gravity models were being used to assist government officials
with economic development and urban planning (Huff, 1963; Lakshmanan,
1964). Subsequently, gravity models were used to predict consumer
preferences for a wide variety of competing retail and service industry
outlets, such as hospitals (Bucklin, 1971), large chain stores (MacKay, 1973),
banks (Ali and Greenbaum, 1977), and movie theatres (Davis, 2006). By the
1970s, gravity models were being extended to the leisure and social travel
industries (Gilbert, Peterson, and Line 1972; Stutz 1973; Vickerman 1974).
However, during this period (1950-1970), there were two additional
developments in the science of gravity modeling. First, as Louis P. Bucklin
(1971, p. 489) observes: “In its original formulation, the retail gravity model
was used to predict the point between two cities where trade between them
would be divided. This ‘breaking point’ defined the geographical size of the
market which each city controlled vis-à-vis the other.” However, Bucklin
(1967a; 1967b) was among the first scholars to test the gravity model’s ability to
predict intra-urban shopping patterns as opposed to inter-urban shopping
patterns. For example, in one study, Bucklin conducted a survey of 500
female heads of household in Oakland, California. In this study, he (1967b,
p. 42) concluded “that mass retains much influence in the selection of an
intra-urban shopping center,” but this innovation also shifted the concept
of mass from the size of an area’s population to the size and composition of
the facility. This subtle shift built on the work of Professor George Schwartz’s
(1963) University of Illinois marketing group, which had generated
impressive statistical evidence to validate Reilly’s original hypothesis that one
could use population or retail square footage as the sole proxy for measuring
retail mass in gravity models.
The results of these studies were so consistent and so reliable that
nearly three decades after the publication of Reilly’s Law of Retail Gravity
(1931), Robert Ferber (1958, 302) was able to declare that: “The two variables
included in Reilly’s Law and in subsequent formulations – population and
distance – account for almost all the variations in sales between cities.”
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Indeed, after three decades of testing Reilly’s Law, Allen F. Jung (1959, p. 62),
a research associate at the University of Chicago suggested that “through
the years little, if any, evidence has been presented which conflicts with
this [Reilly’s] law.” These claims were reaffirmed by David L. Huff (1963,
p. 81), who observed that “empirical evidence is available to indicate that
in many cases the use of such [gravity] models has provided fairly good
approximations of the limits of a number of retail trade areas.”
The Huff Model:
Variety, Time, Income, and Probability
Scholars, retail executives, real estate investors, and urban planners
enthusiastically embraced Reilly’s Law of Retail Gravitation as an iron law of
retail trade distribution, but at the same time a number of methodological
amplifications were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s which culminated
in the introduction of the “Huff model” (Applebaum, 1965, p. 234). It is
actually David L. Huff, a former professor of business at the University
of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), who pioneered the type of gravity
model utilized most frequently by the casino industry and casino industry
consultants. Huff (1963, 85) proposed four modifications to Reilly’s Law
that were critical to the development of the Huff model: (1) Merchandise
Offerings (or the number of items of the kind a consumer desires that are
carried by the retail outlet), (2) the travel time that is involved in getting
from a consumer’s travel base to alternative retail facilities, (3) the average
household income of people living in the trading area, and (4) probability
contours as opposed to breaking points. We might suggest by way of analogy
that just as Newtonian mechanics was superseded – though not displaced –
by Niels Bohrs’ quantum mechanics a similar phenomenon occurred in the
business and social sciences as the focus shifted from aggregate populations
to individual consumer behavior – or from planetary bodies to sub-atomic
particles.
First, Huff suggested that it is not just the square footage that
measures the mass of a retail facility, but rather square footage is really
a proxy indicator for the number of stores, types of stores, and range of
merchandise offerings at a particular location, because it is this variety
that justifies traveling longer distances by making more purchasing
options available at a single location. In the gravity models used by the
casino industry and its consultants, this concept of mass has typically been
operationalized exclusively in terms of gaming positions, where one slot
machine equals one gaming position and one table game equals five or
six positions, because a table can accommodate multiple players.3 These
accumulated modifications to the concept of mass are often referred to today
as “destination effects” (Black, 1983).
Second, and despite widespread recognition of this shortcoming,
most gravity models, including those used in the casino industry are based
58
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on the assumption that customers patronize a facility according to some
rule involving the comparative distance between two facilities, all other
things being equal. A customer prefers facility A over facility B if the
distance to facility A is shorter than some function of the distance to facility
B (Drezner, Drezner, and Eiselt, 1996). However, Richard Nelson (1958, p.
149) was one of the first scholars to suggest that driving time, rather than
distance was a more important determinant of customer preference for
alternative shopping facilities (Nelson, 1958, p. 149). Similarly, by the late
1950s, Eugene J. Kelley (1958, p. 32) had commented that “convenience
costs are assuming more importance as patronage determinants” compared
to distance. Kelley observes by this time that marketers had actually
identified “ten convenience forms” with “place convenience” being only one
of the ten forms. Nevertheless, Kelley’s work continued to emphasize the
importance of place, or geographic area, as defined by the concentration or
dispersion of population as did Reilly.
Yet, Kelley did introduce two new elements into the concept of
place convenience. Kelley (1958, p. 35) challenged the equivalence of “the
distance concept” with “convenience” by noting that distance involves
“time-cost elements rather than a purely spatial one.” Higher road speeds
and the emergence of large planned retail centers were actually changing
consumers’ perceptions of distance, because one could travel further faster
and obtain more goods and services at a single location. Kelley (1958, p.
35) also noted the importance of parking to retail structures as an element
of time convenience, observing that “it is generally agreed that shoppers
resist walking more than 600 feet from their parked cars to the nearest
center store...this suggests a limit to the maximum parking distance” that
can be used before a retail center loses its other advantages over competing
centers and certainly anyone who operates, manages, or visits a casino will
recognize the importance of parking, i.e., finding a space quickly, getting
into the facility quickly, and avoiding inclement weather.
Kelley’s observation was validated in subsequent research, including
a study by Professors James A. Brunner and John L. Mason (1968),
who studied consumer preferences for various shopping centers in Toledo,
Ohio based on drive-times as opposed to distance. The findings confirmed
the drive-time hypothesis as superior to the simple distance concept
proposed by Reilly, but given the limited geographic sample, Brunner and
Mason (1968, p. 61) called on other researchers “to ascertain the degree
to which these observations are generally true for other shopping centers
in other communities.” A license plate survey of 93,500 passenger cars in
18 Greater Cleveland shopping centers by Cox and Cooke (1970, p. 13) in
fact confirmed that “the driving time required to reach a center is highly
influential in determining consumer shopping center preferences” (also see,
McCarthy, 1964, p. 577; Cox and Erickson, 1967, p. 52; Berry, 1967).
However, Cox and Cooke also found that the “drawing power” (i.e.,
gravity factor) of a shopping center still had to be incorporated into the
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gravity model, because consumers were willing to drive farther to reach
a shopping center depending upon “relative attractiveness” compared
to other shopping centers. Cox and Cooke (1970, p. 14) suggested that a
number of factors could be used to measure the attractiveness of a facility,
such as the number of parking spaces, the size of the center, and the types
of stores in the center,” since these factors could partially overcome the
“friction” or “inertia” of drive-time and distance. Furthermore, Gautschi
(1981) points out that the first gravity models constructed to evaluate the
potential trade areas of planned shopping centers assumed the automobile
of the 1950s and the 1960s, as well as the transportation network in
place at the time. Consequently, Gautschi (1981, p. 172) argues that the
development of better, faster, and more comfortable automobiles, the
construction of superior road systems (parkways, interstate highways),
and urban mass transit means (at least theoretically) that “the travel time
parameter has an inflated absolute value,” which “serves to underestimate
the expanse of a center’s trading area.”
However, even as late as 1978, Raymond Hubbard found that “the
vast majority of the literature” on gravity modeling and retail trade areas
still utilized “objective distance data,” rather than drive times partly because
distance data was easily available, but drive times were not available in any
readily useable format. The use of distance, rather than drive-time, has been
almost universal in the casino industry’s gravity models, but the difference
between distance and drive-time can be significant in various geographies
that are not flat, where the width and quality of roads is not consistent,
where weather can be a factor, and where urban congestion or other choke
points can significantly alter the relationship between distance and drivetime. However, the lack of available data on drive-times is a technical
problem that should largely have been eliminated by the introduction of
computer and internet programs, such as MapPoint, Google Maps, Yahoo
Maps, Map Quest, Free Mileage Calculator, and other programs that
have made drive-time data easily accessible for incorporation into gravity
models.
Third, while Reilly accounted for differences of population, he did
not account for differences of income. Yet, as early as 1958, Ferber’s (1958,
p. 303) consumer behavior research, which was based on Reilly’s Law had
found that “income is a major factor influencing variations in per capita
retail sales between cities for most categories of sales.” Similarly, Bucklin
(1967b, p. 42) found that consumer perceptions about the value mass
imparts vary considerably” among consumers depending on the motivation
of consumers. In particular, he found that mass had a higher attraction
(force) for those with higher incomes, since these consumer cohorts were
willing to travel farther to a primary retail center to obtain the benefits
of retail mass, while secondary centers held a greater attraction for those
seeking convenience, and tertiary centers (i.e., small out of the way stores)
were more likely to attract price conscious consumers. Thus, subsequent
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research has found that mass and income are two factors that will interact
to promote “excess travel behavior” (Hubbard, 1978, pp. 8-10). This is not
only because a larger mass exerts more gravitational force on consumers,
but because “those individuals showing evidence of higher income levels
are more readily able to bear the costs involved in shopping around, and
therefore tend to travel greater distances in the journey to consume”
(Hubbard, 1978, p. 9; for example, McAnnally, 1965; Schiller, 1972). Thus,
a larger and more attractive retail facility increases the likelihood that
higher income consumers will travel distances in excess of those that are
theoretically justified (Hubbard, 1978, p. 9). By the late 1960s, consumer
behavior surveys were documenting that the nearest center postulate
“provided an inadequate description of consumer movements” and that
large numbers of consumers deviated from what was defined as “spatially
lawful behavior” (Golledge et al., 1967; Rushton et al., 1967; Hubbard,
1978, pp. 3-4). This is particularly important to gravity modeling in the
casino industry, where surveys have documented that the individuals who
patronize destination resort casinos, in particular, have incomes higher than
the median income of its host jurisdiction (AGA, 2013; Barrow and Borges,
2011).
Finally, David L. Huff (1961, p. 84) identified another significant
limitation to the application of Reilly’s Law, which is that “the calculation
of breaking points to delimit a retail trade area conveys an impression that
a trading area is a fixed boundary circumscribing the market potential of a
retail facility, when in fact there is an exponential distance decay factor of
declining retail attraction within the trade area, as well as interpenetration
and overlap between designated market areas.” This problem had been
identified earlier in the development of gravity modeling by scholars, such
as Edna Douglas, who had mapped trade areas based on actual consumer
origins, rather than distance postulates. Huff (1961, p. 490) built on this
work, but was more emphatic in stating that trading areas do not have hard
boundaries, but shade off into one another and, therefore, “probabilistic models
are appropriate measures of this process.” Thus, Huff proposed that breaking
points be replaced by “exponents,” which are the statistical units that capture
and measure the distance decay factor in terms of the probability that an
individual consumer will choose to patronize a specified facility (Huff
and Jencks, 1968). This does not mean that the breaking point formula is
irrelevant, but that it defines the 0.50 probabilistic contour or the point up
to which a customer has a greater or less than fifty percent (50%) probability
of selecting one facility over another. The lines demarcating or connecting
the geographical units with comparable decay factors on a map are called
“probability contours” instead of market boundaries, because they delimit
the statistical probability that individuals will select a particular trading area
or facility.
The “most obvious deficiency” in the application of this principle at
the time was “the lack of direct information on the actual spatial movements
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and expenditures of individuals” (Golledge et al., 1966, p. 261). This
difficult has largely been removed in the casino industry where the annual
Harrah’s (2006) surveys of “propensity to gamble” – now conducted by the
American Gaming Association (2007-2013) – has provided reliable data
at the state level. The development of sophisticated players’ club databases,
hotel guest databases, and daily headcounts by casinos have perhaps
made the industry a leader in this area, particularly as this proprietary
information is often provided to consultants, who can then develop more
elaborate models based on actual player origins and gaming behavior (e.g.,
spend per visit).
The Huff model, which was first articulated in two articles published
in 1963 and 1964, incorporated these four modifications to Reilly’s Law
to construct an alternative model of retail gravitation based on consumer
behavior theory and goods theory, rather than central place theory. In
Huff ’s (1963, pp. 87-88) article, he walks the reader through a seven step
process for constructing a gravity model that incorporates drive times
and that maps trade areas based on exponential decay factors, the actual
population residing within these probabilistic contours, and the average
household income of the households residing within each contour of the
map. The seven step process for constructing a Huff models is as follows:
1. “Divide the area surrounding any existing or proposed shopping
center into small statistical units. These units could be Census
enumeration districts.
2. Determine the square footage of retail selling space of all shopping
centers included within the area of analysis.
3. Ascertain the travel time involved in getting from a particular
statistical unit to each of the specified shopping centers.
4. Calculate the probability of consumers in each of the statistical units
going to the particular shopping center under investigation for a
given product purchase.
5. Map the trading area of the shopping center in question by drawing
lines connecting all statistical units having like probabilities.
6. Calculate the number of households within each of the statistical
units. The, multiply each of these figures by their appropriate
probability values to determine the expected number of consumers
(expressed in households) who will patronize the shopping center in
question for a particular product purchase.
7. Determine the annual average per household incomes of each of
the statistic units. Compare such figures to corresponding annual
household budget expenditures in order to determine the average
expected amounts spent by such families on various classes of
products, e.g., clothing and furniture. Estimate annual sales for the
shopping center under investigation by multiplying each of the
product budget figures by expected number of consumers from
each statistical unit who are expected to patronize the shopping
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center in question. Then, sum these individual estimates to arrive at a
total annual sales potential by product class for the selected shopping
center” (Huff 1963, 87-88).
With respect to Step 6: Huff (1963, p. 87) notes that “in addition
to the likelihood [propensity] of consumers from various statistical units
patronizing a proposed shopping center, it is necessary to know the expected
number of such consumers from each of the units. For example, it might be
that a given contour possesses a high probability value but the consumers
within its confines may be few in number” and, therefore, provide few
customers and little revenue to the proposed facility. Similarly, with respect
to Step 7, Huff (1963, p. 88) observes that “in terms of purchasing potential,
another contour possessing a much smaller expected number of consumers
may have a greater disposable income level and thus greater purchasing
potential.”
A formal expression of the Huff (1964, p. 36) model is:
(Equation 2)
Sj
Pi j = ______
Ti j ∆
				

•
•
•
•

n
∑
j=1

Sj
Ti j∆

where Pij = the probability of a consumer at a given point of
origin traveling to a particular shopping center j;
Sj = the size of a shopping center j (measured in terms of
the square footage of selling area devoted to the sale of a
particular class of goods);
Ti j = the travel time involved in getting from a consumer’s
travel base I to a given shopping center j; and
∆ = a parameter which is to be estimated empirically to
reflect the effect of travel time on various kinds of shopping
trips.

As Huff (1964, p. 36) described it, the expected number of consumers
at a given place of origin i that shop at a particular shopping center j is
equal to the number of consumers at i multiplied by the probability that a
consumer at i will select j for shopping.
That is:
(Equation 3)
Ei j = Pi j * Ci
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•
•

where Ei j = the expected number of consumers at i that are
likely to travel to shopping center j; and
Ci = the number of consumers at i.

Huff (1964, p. 36) noted that his model “resembles the original
model formulated by Reilly,” but he argued that it differed from Reilly’s Law
of Retail Gravitation “in several important respects.” The most important
theoretical difference is that Huff ’s (1964, pp. 36-37) model was not a
“contrived formulation” designed post-hoc to describe observed empirical
regularities, but “a theoretical abstraction of consumer spatial behavior.” As
a result, real data including population, average household income, square
footage, drive times, and propensity factors can be used in mathematical
calculations to deduce probabilistic conclusions about the number of
consumers and the spend per consumer that for a particular type and size of
retail facility.
Gravity Models and Casino Gaming
The first likely use of gravity modeling as a means of forecasting
casino revenues was by Economics Research Associates (ERA), an
economics consulting firm, which produced a study in 1976 on the potential
economic and fiscal impacts of legalized casino gaming in Atlantic City,
New Jersey. The ERA study was released into a highly charged political
atmosphere, since the forecasts from the study were incorporated into
campaign literature developed by the Committee to Rebuild Atlantic City,
which at the time was the state’s leading pro-gaming coalition (Heneghan,
1999, p. 119). The model’s forecasts evidently proved persuasive because the
New Jersey referendum passed, but the ERA model immediately revealed
both the promise and the shortcomings of gravity modeling in the casino
industry.
As a model designed to forecast revenues from a regional base of
commuter shoppers, it proved ill-equipped to accurately estimate visitations
and revenues in a new industry, while comparisons to Las Vegas proved
misleading for a new type of gaming market. On the one hand, as Dan
Heneghan (1999, p. 120) points out: “the projections proved to be way
off,” because “the promises turned out to be extremely conservative.” ERA’s
projections on annual visitations proved far too conservative with respect
to the number of visitors, but far too optimistic on the length of stay by
visitors, partly because Las Vegas was the only gaming jurisdiction at the
time and it was not recognized that Atlantic City would be designed as a
new type of regional commuter destination, rather than a site for integrated
resort casinos. Atlantic City became a regional commuter destination,
rather than a national or international destination, such as Las Vegas, but
it was one that happened to be in the middle of one of the most densely
populated areas of the United States. Similarly, the employment projections
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derived from the ERA model “were so conservative that the low end [of the
employment projections] was passed by the end of 1980” (Heneghan 1999,
p. 121). The same was true with respect to forecasts about tax revenues and
capital investment (Heneghan 1999, pp. 123-27). However, the Atlantic
City experience established a familiar pattern of critics claiming that the
industry consultant’s projections were exaggerated, while in fact they
proved far too conservative.
The difficulty of calibrating gravity models to a new industry, where
reliable comparative data and primary behavioral data were in short supply,
would be revisited many times over the next two decades, particularly after
the federal government passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
in 1988 to provide a legal framework for the expansion of tribal gaming
across the United States (Rand and Light, 2006). At the same time, several
states legalized commercial casinos, including South Dakota (1989), Iowa
(1989), Colorado (1990), Illinois (1990), Mississippi (1990), Louisiana
(1991), Missouri (1993), Indiana (1993), and Michigan (1996). Thus, as
expanded gambling took hold in the United States, John Williams (1997)
correctly argued that one of the main areas of future research in gambling
studies would be patronage and revenue forecasts. Williams (1997, pp. 402403) did not elaborate how this research would be conducted, nor did he
recognize that it would mainly be conducted by private consultants, rather
than university-based scholars, but he did identify the specific data points
and comparative factors that would have to be incorporated into future
visitation and revenue models, including:
• population, demographics, and disposable income,
• existing visitors, both domestic and international,
• ease of access to the casino, domestically and
internationally,
• regional propensity to gamble and outlets for it,
• residents who go to other countries to gamble,
• limitations on opening hours, types of gambling and credit,
and,
• the performance of other casinos in the region, from which
some parallels can be drawn.
Williams’ recommendations might have provided the basis for a
national research agenda for the growing number of scholars interested in
the gaming industry, but at least the casino industry’s leading economic
consultants seem to have adopted variations of the framework established
by Williams (and even earlier by Huff). One could multiply examples and
case studies endlessly, but a few examples from the New England expanded
gaming debate are examined here to illustrate our main thesis.
The first major wave of Indian and commercial gaming expansion
into non-traditional jurisdictions (1988-1996) ignited expanded gaming
debates in almost every region of the United States – the Mid-Atlantic
states, the Mississippi River Valley, the Upper Mid-West, the Rocky
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Mountains, the Southwest, the Northwest, and New England. In New
England, the resounding success of Foxwoods Resort Casino in Ledyard,
Connecticut immediately set off what became a perennial expanded
gaming debate in almost every New England state with Massachusetts
sitting at the epicenter of that debate, because of its regional population
and wealth.
In Massachusetts, former Governor William Weld brokered a
proposed gaming compact in 1995 with the Aquinnah Wampanoag
Tribe of Gayhead to open a $200 million resort casino in New Bedford,
Massachusetts (Halbfinger, 1996). The Weld compact would have granted
the Aquinnah Wampanoag Tribe exclusive casino rights in eastern
Massachusetts in exchange for 25% of the casino’s gross gaming revenues,
while allowing a limited number of slot machines at the state’s four
racetracks (Vaillancourt, 1994). A patron origin analysis released by the
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth estimated that Massachusetts
residents accounted for approximately 33% of Foxwoods’ annual visitations
and that Massachusetts residents were spending at least $300 million per
year gambling at Connecticut’s billion dollar casino in 1995 (Dense and
Barrow, 2003). Nevertheless, the Weld compact was rejected by the state’s
House of Representatives.
In 1997, Governor Weld filed new casino legislation that would
have allowed the Aquinnah Wampanoag Tribe to operate one casino in
New Bedford, while authorizing a second casino in Hampden County
(western Massachusetts), and authorizing 700 slot machines at each of the
state’s four racetracks. The governor’s new bill died in committee without
a vote. However, the expanded gambling issue was resurrected in 1999,
when State Senator James P. Jajuga filed a bill known as the Massachusetts
Casino Control Act that would have authorized the licensing of three
resort casinos in Southeastern Massachusetts, Western Massachusetts, and
Northeastern Massachusetts, where voters in each of the three regions had
already passed non-binding referenda to host a casino.
For the first time, and to bolster proponents’ claims about the
potential economic impacts of the proposed casinos, a group of business
people in the western Town of Palmer known as the Committee for
Palmer Growth and Development hired Economics Research Associates
to prepare a Gaming Market Analysis for 3 Massachusetts Locations (1999).
Like each of the examples that follow, the ERA (1999, pp. 16-19) model is
“semi-transparent” insofar as it identifies the types of data incorporated
into the model (and often summarizes that data in tabular form). The
model incorporates total population, adult population (aged 21+), number
of households, average per capita income, and aggregate income in 30
minute drive time zones. The data is attributed to Claritas, although
ERA (1999, p. 16) “developed population and income estimates for the
resident population for drive times,” and then relies on these estimates “for
estimating the market shares between the casino locations.” However, the
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equations and other assumptions used to derive final estimates of demand
(i.e., gross gaming revenues), the weights assigned to various factors in the
model (e.g., drive-time), and the internal mechanics of the model are never
specified in the report. Moreover, the ERA (1999, pp. 3, 8-11) report never
specifies a comparative gravity factor for any of the proposed casinos, but
merely asserts that “the Massachusetts casinos would be of sufficient size
to compete with other casino offerings in the northeast” in terms of slot
machines, table games, and “appropriate amenities.”
In this case, Economic Research Associates (1999, p. 12)
operationalized a simple but standard gravity model. It uses “drive times
as one means of estimating the potential numbers of adults 21 and over
who live within varying drive times distances from the three locations.
These [drive time bands] are broken into approximately half-hour
increments…for purposes of approximating figures for attendance and
revenue.” For purposes of estimating the number of annual casino visits
and forecasting revenues in a stabilized year, ERA (1999, 18) applies the
national average (not locally specific) propensity to gamble, including
the national average trips per year to casinos published in the Harrah’s
Survey of Casino Entertainment (1996), although as recommended by
Walker, the report also makes comparisons to the Atlantic City and
Connecticut casinos to further calibrate revenue and visitation estimates
with purportedly comparable jurisdictions (ERA 1999, pp. 7-11). However,
it does not appear that the model applies any type of distance decay factor
as would be required in a more sophisticated Huff model. Finally, the ERA
(1999, p. 18) report assumes a 20% “Tourism Factor” to account for nonregional casino visitors and revenues, based on Atlantic City bus arrivals,
which is a typical approach when confronted with this problem, because
standard gravity models cannot account for this type of visitor within their
normal parameters. The tourism factor is, in effect, a shot in the dark –
an educated guesstimate that could vary wildly from one jurisdiction to
another depending on location and the amenities necessary to generate a
destination effect.4
The ERA report concluded that three resort casinos distributed
across Massachusetts would generate 13.7 million annual visits and $1.1
billion in annual gross gaming revenue, but the 1999 Massachusetts
Casino Control Act was pigeonholed in a House committee and the
expanded gaming debate shifted to Rhode Island. In Rhode Island, a
proposal by Boyd Gaming Corporation and the Narragansett Indian Tribe
to build a $500 million destination resort casino was rejected by the Rhode
Island State Legislature in 2000 (Mello, 2000). However, soon thereafter,
Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (now Caesar’s Entertainment, Inc.) and the
Narragansett Indian Tribe proposed a $600 million destination resort
casino in the Town of West Warwick, Rhode Island. Proponents of the
casino retained Christiansen Capital Advisors (CCA), which prepared a
report on the Potential Impacts of a West Warwick Casino: Draft Report
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(2004). The CCA report (2004, 6) operationalizes a “supply side” model,
in contrast to the demand side model exemplified by the ERA report, and
states that “a convincing gauge of capacity constraints” is “gaming revenue
and win/unit/day” for the facilities serving a gambling market.” Based on
comparative data for the New England gaming market, the report (2004,
p. 6) concludes that “the observed distant adjusted spending per adult at
the two Connecticut casinos [i.e., Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun] and at
the two pari-mutuel facilities [i.e., Newport Grand and Lincoln], while
certainly respectable at $586.50 and an average of around $514 respectively,
is lower than the rate of spending for similar facilities in other more fully
supplied jurisdictions.” In the CCA (2004, p. 8) report, the “distant adjusted
spending” at existing New England gaming facilities, compared to national
averages, provides the basis for estimating “the demand for a casino to be
located in West Warwick, Rhode Island.”
A follow up analysis entitled, Community Impacts of a Narragansett
Casino in West Warwick (2006, p. 1) “examined a scenario in which a
casino resort facility with approximately 140,000 square feet of casino floor,
150 table games of the kind offered at Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun, 3,500
slot machines and other gaming devices of the kind offered at Foxwoods
and Mohegan Sun, 500 hotel rooms, five restaurants, spa, premium lounge
and 55,000 square feet of meeting space is constructed…in West Warwick,
Rhode Island at an approximate total cost of $1 billion.” This follow-up
report (2006, pp. 1-7) contains a statement of estimated revenues and
visitations for the proposed casino, but in this case there is absolutely no
discussion of inputs and methodology in what appears to be a standard
gravity model and thus decision-makers and the general public are left
to take its findings on trust and good faith in what is inevitably a highly
charged and politicized public debate. A referendum authorizing the
proposed casino was defeated 63% to 37% on November 7, 2006.
Following the six year expanded gaming debate in Rhode
Island, which resulted in three successive defeats for expanded gaming
proponents, the debate shifted back to Massachusetts when on October
11, 2007, Governor Deval Patrick filed legislation to authorize up to three
destination resort casinos in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In
his message to the State Senate and House of Representatives, Governor
Patrick indicated that the primary goal of his proposal was “to spur
economic development and job growth throughout the Commonwealth”
(Barrow, 2008). However, the governor’s revenue and jobs projections
were immediately dismissed by legislative critics, who began calling for
an “independent study” to review the governor’s projections. In response,
the Secretary of Economic Development issued a competitive request
for proposals that eventually led to the hiring of Spectrum Gaming on
February 22, 2008 as “an independent third-party firm with specific
expertise in the gaming industry.” Spectrum Gaming was charged with
examining the saturation point for gambling in New England, generating
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revenue projections based on the governor’s proposal, and estimating the
potential impact on the state lottery.
On August 1, 2008, Spectrum Gaming released its Comprehensive
Analysis: Projecting and Preparing for Potential Impact of Expanded
Gaming on Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The report (2008, p. 76)
contains two forecasts of estimated gross gaming revenues and annual
visitations:
“First, we look at the basic demand for the type of planned
destination casinos, absent any specific marketing programs
that would rely on hotel rooms to target and reward gaming
customers. This allows us to conservatively project the level
of demand based on population within a reasonable driving
distance. Second, we follow that with certain assumptions
regarding the potential use of hotel rooms as marketing tools
to develop our revenue estimates.”
In the first phase of the demand analysis, Spectrum (2008, pp. 7778) operationalizes a standard gravity model that incorporates “a variety of
factors for each of these [three proposed] properties, which we assumed to
be in the center of each of these [three] regions. These factors include, but
are not limited to:
• Total population,
• Number of adults,
• The number and quality of competitors with in a two-hour drive,
• Number of slots and tables within that drive time,
• The type and quality of amenities of each competitor,
• Each competitor‘s distance from center of each region,
• The gaming value of each region adjusted for household income
levels.”
These factors are the typical inputs into a gravity model, but the
report immediately moves to a forecast of gross gaming revenues without
any further explanation of the model’s internal mechanics, gravity factors,
weights, or calculations. The initial model’s gravity factor appears to be
based exclusively on “the number of slots and tables,” since the report
(2008, p. 79) deploys a second gravity model that includes “the use of
hotel rooms as marketing tools.” Yet, how this factor gets incorporated
into, or appended onto, the initial model is not explained in the report
beyond the notion that by setting aside 50% of hotel rooms as “comps”
for preferred players, it will add “incremental gaming revenue” above
that normally expected for a regional commuter facility (Spectrum, 2008,
p. 81). Moreover, there is no discussion of whether or how “the type and
quality of amenities of each competitor” impacts revenues and visitation
estimates so despite claiming that these factors are part of the model there
is no explicit indication that these factors are actually incorporated into the
model or, if so, in what way.
The Massachusetts House of Representatives rejected Governor
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Patrick’s casino proposal on March 20, 2008 by a vote of 108 to 46.
However, following a change in legislative leadership, expanded gaming
again returned to the top of the state’s legislative agenda. While now
generally supportive of the governor’s previous gaming proposal, the
State Senate decided to update the previous economic and fiscal analysis
and commissioned a second report by the Innovation Group, entitled
Massachusetts Statewide Gaming Report (2010). The Innovation Group
(2010, pp. 86-87) tends to be more transparent than most in the description
of its gravity model for Massachusetts, which is based on the identification
of distinct market areas:
“Using our GIS software and Claritas database, the gamer
population [aged 21+], latitude and longitude, and average
household income is collected for each postal code. Each
of these market areas is assigned a unique set of propensity
and frequency factors…both propensity and frequency are
inversely related to travel time to a casino. In other words,
as travel times increase, both the percentage of persons
who gamble and the number of times they visit a casino
tend to decrease. Gaming behavior also varies based on
the availability and quality of the gaming experience.
Alternative forms of entertainment are also a factor in
determining gaming behavior. For this analysis, propensity
and frequency rates for each market area are based on
survey data presented earlier in this report and extrapolating
information provided in public filings and published reports
on gaming behavior in the region. Gamer visits are then
generated from postal codes within each of the market areas
based on these factors and distributed among the competitors
based upon the size of each facility, its attractiveness, and
the relative distance from the postal code in question. The
gravity model then calculates the probabilistic distribution
of gamer visits from each market area to each of the gaming
locations in the market.”
The Innovation Group’s gravity model incorporates the standard
factors, including adult population, average household income, drive time,
average propensity to gamble, and the availability and quality of competing
facilities. As with most such models, one can infer that some variation
of the standard Huff equations are used to derive revenue and visitation
estimates. Yet, the generic description of the model appears to incorporate
“attractiveness” and “quality of the gaming experience,” which suggests that
factors other than gaming positions are being incorporated into the model
as part of its gravity factor. However, when one examines a methodological
section entitled Attraction Factors, which “measure the relative attraction
of one casino in relation to others in the market,” one finds that “attraction
factors are applied to the size of the casino as measured by the number
70

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal w Volume 18 Issue 1

Gravity Models and Casino Gaming

of positions it has in the market. Positions are defined as the number
of gaming machines, plus the number of gaming seats at the tables”
(Innovation, 2010, p. 89). In other words, slot machines and tables are the
only measures of attractiveness (i.e., gravity).
One encounters a similar phenomenon in a response for
proposals (RFP) submitted to the Town of Plainville, Massachusetts by
Cummings Associates (2013), which includes examples of other gravity
models operationalized by the consultant. Despite another misfire in
2010, Governor Deval Patrick finally signed a bill on November 22, 2011
that authorizes three destination resort casinos and one slot parlor in
the state. Massachusetts is moving forward with the licensing process,
which requires potential casino operators to negotiate host community
agreements with local officials and to have that agreement ratified by voters
in a local referendum. The Town of Plainville, Massachusetts already hosts
a harness racing track, which is bidding on the one authorized slot parlor
license. To assist it in negotiating the host community agreement, the Town
of Plainville hired Cummings Associates through a competitive bid process
to prepare an analysis that includes “a gravity-model analysis of the likely
market for the proposed slot-machine facility at Plainridge” (Cummings, 2013,
p. 2).
Cummings Associates (2013, p. 6) states that “this type of analysis
is based on ‘geography:’ where do potential customers live, and how
far (or more accurately, how long) do they have to travel to visit any
existing or prospective casino that might be convenient for them?” The
basic assumption of the gravity model is “that other things being equal,
the surrounding population will tend to patronize each facility at rates
sin1ilar to those elsewhere” (Ibid., p. 13). In their proposal to the Town
of Plainville, Cummings notes that “a description of this methodology
and assessment of some of its finer points may be found in several of the
papers and PowerPoint presentations I have delivered to several of the
International Conferences on Gambling and Risk-Taking,” where the
principal investigator (2006) has documented that a casino’s gravity is “not
always according to Reilly.”
In an exemplary work submitted as part of the proposal, Assessment
of the Value of A License for a New Casino in Davenport, Iowa (July 21,
2008), Cummings’ (2008, p. 2) concurs with CCA that the “Slot Win/Unit/
Day” figure is a common measure of performance in the casino industry,
because slot machines typically provide 90%+ of the revenues (and even more
of the profits) of most regional casinos.” Thus, Cummings (2008, 2) argues
that “slot performance is usually the single most revealing measure of such
performance.” However, Cummings adds another level of sophistication to this
measure by developing what he calls a casino’s “Power Rating” (i.e., a type of
gravity factor), which measures a casino’s ability to draw consumer spending
from the surrounding population by comparing the number of slot machines
at competing facilities and the win per unit per day at competing facilities
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(Cummings 2008, Exhibits 6-13). The Cummings (2008, p. 2) Power Rating
indicator takes:
“the spending of the average adult who lives within the
market of each casino at its slot machines, and compares
it to a benchmark average of $700 per adult per year
(who lives within ten miles of that casino, adjusted for
distance and competition). A power rating of 100 therefore
represents average spending of $700 per adult (again,
adjusted for distance and competition).”
Cummings observes that a casino’s Power Rating is similar to, but
an extension of, the “Fair Share” concept pioneered by Larry Klatzkin and
that is now used by many casino analysts. The Fair Share concept is that if
a casino has 20% of the slots within a market, but attracts 22% of the slot
revenues, it is attracting ll0% of its “fair share” of the market, although
Cummings (2008, p. 2 fn. 3) “extends this element of comparison not just
with other casinos in the area but also with the size and distribution of the
surrounding population.” However, despite being a model of transparency,
when one examines the tables and exhibits where the Power Ratings are
defined, the power ratings tables suggest that table games, hotel rooms,
and even attractiveness are components of the power rating, but in fact the
Cummings Power Rating is still based entirely on slot machines.
Analysis and Conclusion
There has been almost no academic literature on gravity modeling
in the casino industry, although a number of well-established and reputable
consulting firms have developed proprietary gravity models, including
Economics Research Associates, Spectrum Gaming Group, The Innovation
Group, Christiansen Capital Advisors, Wells Gaming Research, Cummings
Associates, and many other management and financial consulting firms.
In these gravity models, the problem of transparency is at least partially
resolved by assuming that these models use some version of the Huff
equations, including distance decay factors (i.e., drive times and propensity
to gamble), although in some earlier models this was clearly not the case.
Moreover, it is clear that greater sophistication has been introduced into
these models over time as it became possible to use towns and cities, zip
codes, census county divisions, or census blocks as the geographic units
for population and income. The geographical units might vary depending
on the political jurisdictions in different parts of the country or the
availability of prepackaged commercial databases (e.g., Claritas, ESRI), but
improvements in data availability, comparative jurisdictions, and access to
players club data have no doubt improved the overall reliability of gravity
models.
Likewise, official government data on disposable personal income,
per capita income, and average household income for these units of
analysis has become more easily available as a result of CD-ROMs, the
internet, and the commercial repackaging of public data. Spreadsheet
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programs, a user-friendly Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS),
and other statistical software packages, coupled with rapid developments
in personal computing power have made it possible to construct gravity
models with tens of thousands of individual data points that can be
linked together in mathematical formulas. Expectations about spend per
visitor and the propensity to gamble are now based on behavioral surveys,
proprietary data from comparable existing casinos, data from comparable
casino jurisdictions, and proprietary consultant databases constructed
through many years of access to casinos’ players’ clubs and other databases.
Consequently, a casino’s ability to attract visitations and spending can be
reasonably estimated using gravity models, which incorporate data on the
number of people living at different distances from an existing or proposed
casino. However, we want to suggest that some important modifications
to these models could improve their performance and may be necessary
going forward in the industry. In this respect, the function and complexity
of gravity models in the casino industry has already undergone at least
three phases of development, with the most recent phase requiring that we
reconsider how to measure the gravity factor – or mass – of casinos.
The first phase of gravity modeling in the casino industry was the
period of its greatest expansion (1976-1999), beginning with the opening
of casinos in Atlantic City and culminating with the opening of three
commercial casinos in Detroit, Michigan. During this phase, casinos were
opening in new jurisdictions, often with limited entry restrictions designed
to protect new operators, so gravity models were comparatively simple
efforts to measure the potential revenue that would be captured by casinos,
including the percentage of revenues and visitors that would be captured
from out-of-state or out-of-region visitors (Eadington, 1995; 1998; Hsu,
1999, Chaps. 5-8; Walker, 2007, Chap. 2-4; Meister, Rand, and Light, 2009).
The second phase of gravity modeling has revolved around later
entrants to the expanded gaming movement, including new expansions,
such as New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Maine, and Ohio (2005 -2012), where gravity modeling has focused more
on the ability of local or regional facilities to recapture visitors and revenues
from adjacent states (Barrow and Borges, 2010; Dense and Barrow, 2003;
McGowan, 2009). This has meant that location (distance) and mass have
become more important to estimating a casino’s probability of success
in the political terms that now structure expanded gaming debates. It
also means that gravity models have become increasingly complex, or
confronted with increasing difficulties in measuring the comparative
impact of different facilities in increasingly congested market areas.
Moreover, as expanded gaming debates have shifted from capturing
revenues from adjacent states to recapturing revenues being lost to adjacent
states, it has raised an additional question for gravity modelers: What types
and size of gaming facilities (i.e., mass) are necessary to effectively compete
with existing gaming facilities in adjacent states, particularly if the objective
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is to generate a new destination as opposed to merely recapturing local
convenience gamblers. This has juxtaposed the question of using multiple
small convenience facilities taxed at high rates to capture convenience
gamblers (e.g., Pennsylvania) against the construction of resort casinos
designed to generate new destinations and bolster the larger tourism and
hospitality industry (e.g., Massachusetts).
Finally, it appears that gravity modeling is about to enter a third
phase of development as expanded gaming reaches maturity, but new
market entrants either seek to enter saturated or nearly saturated markets
at lower operating margins or they seek to displace existing venues by
constructing more elaborate facilities with a higher gravity factor. This
debate is already surfacing in a number of U.S. jurisdictions and it means
that the problem of measuring “mass” is becoming even more important in
the construction of gravity models for the casino industry.
First, Huff models require investigators to have reliable survey
data on the propensity to gamble at different distances from a casino, data
from comparable facilities (e.g., players club databases), or it requires one
to make reasonable assumptions about the distance decay factor, which
theoretically declines exponentially at regular distances from a central
place (e.g., 30 minutes). However, with the onset of the Great Recession
in late 2007, the overall propensity to gamble declined in all of the New
England states, as elsewhere in the country, which is directly related to
rising unemployment, decreases in disposable personal income, increased
savings rates, and declining home values. The general principle of distance
decay remained intact during the Great Recession, but the propensity to
gamble decreased across-the-board, which for the first time, has forced
gravity modelers to recognize that propensity factors are not fixed by time
or place, but can shift upwards or downwards significantly depending
on the macro-level economy (Barrow and Borges 2007a; 2007b; 2009;
2011; 2013). These assumptions need to be recalibrated, at least for the
time being, and in the future it must be recognized that the propensity to
gamble will likely be cyclical in nature, especially once a gaming market
reaches saturation.
Second, the mass of a retail shopping center was traditionally
measured in square feet, but Huff offered persuasive arguments that
square footage was really a proxy for the range of merchandise offerings
and the range of choices available to consumers. The number and range
of retail offerings in the case of casinos is a function of gaming space,
gaming positions, and the range of non-gaming amenities. The size of a
gaming facility can be measured in square feet of gaming space, or the
number of gaming positions, but another significant determinant of mass
is also the basis of the distinction between destination resort casinos and
convenience gaming facilities, which have significantly different amounts
of gravitational force.
A major lacuna in the standard gravity model, as applied to casinos,
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is that gaming positions are not the only measure of a casino’s mass. A
resort casino’s mass and, therefore, its gravitational force is also a function
of its range of games, which typically include table games and poker and
it is not clear that one table equals six slot machines, because tables may
attract a fundamentally different type of customer (Barrow and Borges,
2013). Thus, the availability of table games and the number of table games
needs to be accounted for and weighted separately from slot machines.
A casino with table games will necessarily attract a new cohort of players
simply because slot parlors do not offer table games so it does not make
sense to assume that 60 additional slot machines has the same weight as ten
table games in calculating a gravity factor.
Furthermore, many gamblers are seeking an entertainment
experience that includes more than just gambling or one that generates
a different general atmosphere. Thus, a resort casino’s gravity is also
a function of its non-gaming amenities. In 2012, for example, the New
England Gaming Behavior Survey (Barrow and Borges, 2013) found
that 69% of the individuals from Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Maine who visited Foxwoods Resort or Mohegan Sun in
the previous twelve months did not visit either Twin River or Newport
Grand in Rhode Island, despite their closer functional distance to these
population centers. Furthermore, the non-gaming component of casino
entertainment complexes is becoming increasingly important to a casino’s
competitiveness. In New England, the percentage of visitors to Foxwoods
Resort and Mohegan Sun, who report that they rarely or never gamble
has increased from 8% in 2006 to 22% in 2012 (Barrow and Borges,
2007a, p. 15; 2013, p. 12). The American Gaming Association’s (2013,
pp. 3, 27-28) most recent survey of American gamblers finds that 26%
of casino visitors nationwide report that they rarely or never gamble.
Thus, it is clear that non-gaming amenities need to be incorporated into
the calculation of gravity factors in some manner and to some significant
extent. These amenities include parking spaces, hotel rooms, conference
and meeting facilities, restaurants and bars, live entertainment venues,
dance clubs, spas, RV parks, and golf courses. The authors agree that
the exact weighting of non-gaming amenities is a matter for further
discussion, but the magnitude of this difference could theoretically
shift the breaking point and related probabilistic contours of a casino
to a significant degree when assessing competitive impacts on existing
facilities.
Finally, the evolution of casinos from gambling parlors to regional
entertainment complexes and tourism attractions means that the
problem of the tourist factor needs to be addressed in some explicit
way. It appears that most gravity modelers, including the authors, when
confronted with this problem simply choose a percentage add-on to the
base gravity model, such as a 10% or 20% increment to gross gaming
revenues. However, a more accurate tourism factor will require better
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local and regional tourism data (which is often quite sketchy), surveys
of the gaming interests of tourists, and analysis of the increasing role of
casinos in attracting tourists, conventions, and business travelers.5
The claim that gravity models need to incorporate non-gaming
amenities when forecasting the potential revenues or competitive
impact of new and existing casinos is also grounded in earlier critiques
of gravity modeling, such as those by Cox (1959), Bucklin (1967), and
Black (1983), who suggest that consumers make choices based on the
aggregate utility or aggregate convenience of competing options. Louis
P. Bucklin (1967, 37) notes that the earliest gravity models generally
used a single variable such as population or retail square footage (or
gaming positions) as a proxy for mass, although more recent research
on consumer behavior confirms the importance of mass in shifting the
consumer’s ideal breaking point (DeSarbo, Choi, and Spaulding, 2002)
and, therefore, the importance of defining it accurately. William Black
(1983, pp. 18-19) has also called on scholars to more precisely specify
and measure “the attractiveness component” of retail mass through the
use of multiple attractiveness measures, which is what we propose by
incorporating table games and non-gaming amenities into casino gravity
models. For casinos, these factors may also include physical appearance,
cleanliness, safety, luxury, the availability of different games, various
types of food and beverage outlets, gaming floor service, employee
friendliness, the surrounding vicinity, and brand name. However, a gravity
model cannot specify or quantify these factors in any objective manner
without additional locally specific research on gambling behavior and this
continues to be a limitation of gravity models (Thompson, 1963).
More importantly, however, these limitations have three major
implications for public and private decision-makers. First, as the casino
market approaches maturity, and even saturation in some jurisdictions,
there will continue to be proposals to move casinos closer to population
and income centers. These new facilities will negatively impact existing
casinos and traditional gravity models will likely understate that
negative effect, particularly since the new trend is toward more and
more elaborate non-gaming amenities. Thus, there is the potential to
understate job losses and tax revenue losses at existing facilities and,
thereby, overstate the net economic and fiscal benefits of new casinos
in some jurisdictions. Furthermore, new operators entering saturated
markets will have a vested interest in understanding their negative impacts
on existing facilities to gain approval for their facilities and, hence, there
may be pressure on the industry’s consultants to retain the standard
gravity model even when it is not the most accurate tool for evaluating
economic and fiscal impacts.
Another diffculty in evaluating the impact of proposed new
facilities in congested markets is that gravity models were originally
designed to measure the comparative gravity of two competing regions
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or facilities. However, as the distance between casinos shrinks in
congested and saturated markets, gravity modelers confront the di.culty
of evaluating multiple overlapping market areas, which the traditional
contour map has difficulty representing and which the standard gravity
model has difficulty processing as new exponents overlap with already
overlapping exponents. One can simply assign market share to a cluster of
facilities based on gravity factors, but this requires more accurate gravity
factors and it also evades the problem of the quality of travel networks
and location (direction of travel) in selecting a casino.
Second, state gambling policies have been shifting from an
emphasis on revenue generation to an emphasis on job creation and
this further shifts the emphasis from slot machines to table games and
to non-gaming amenities (Barrow, 2012). At the same time, as casino
markets become more competitive, and slot machines become a widely
available commodity, existing casinos are making the decision internally
to add more non-gaming amenities, such as hotels, outlet malls, RV parks,
convention centers and meeting space, golf courses, bowling alleys,
concert halls, and sporting arenas to differentiate themselves from other
gaming venues. These items increase the gravity of existing casinos and,
thus, bring more visitors to an existing casino, including more employees.
However, as local and state government officials have become more
sophisticated in their economic development policies, they are seeking
impact fees, infrastructure and public safety mitigation funds, revenue
sharing, etc. Once again, casino operators have a vested interested in
understanding these impacts by relying on existing gravity models that
understate visitations and impacts.
Finally, these considerations could substantially affect policymakers’ decisions on whether to authorize new facilities (both
commercial and Indian), the size and type of facilities, and the location of
new facilities (i.e., distance and spacing requirements). These issues are
already surfacing in many jurisdictions and, consequently, the theoretical
limitations of gravity modeling present the industry and its regulators
with a practical policy issue that is likely to intensify with time and that
will put gravity models at the center of these debates.
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Endnotes
1 The earliest pre-Reilly “gravity models” were pioneered by chain
tobacco shops attempting to identify the volume, composition, and quality
of pedestrian traffic in different locations to scientifically identify the best
and most profitable locations for opening tobacco stores. Oil companies
later applied the same research technique to automobile traffic as the basis
for identifying sites for gasoline stations (Applebaum 1965, p. 234).
2 For a critical analysis of the empirical evidence used in formulating
the Law of Retail Gravitation, see (Schwartz, 1962).
3Mass factors into convenience, because if a slot machine player
repeatedly finds that a local casino’s gaming devices are occupied, and
that there is a long wait time to find a position at their preferred device,
they will often be willing to travel a longer distance to a larger facility to
insure that a position is available, since the “time to position” (i.e., drive
plus wait) is essentially the same or shorter, despite the longer initial drivetime.

In a more recent example, Spectrum Gaming Group prepared a
2011 market feasibility analysis which found that three destination resort
casinos in South Florida would generate $1 billion in tax revenue for
the State of Florida. However, in a more study prepared for the Florida
Legislature (2013), it would find that “wide open” gaming – 33 casinos
and six destination resorts – would cause the state to lose $22 million a
year. When queried about the significant difference in results, the official
response was “different assumptions” about tourist visits, with the former
study’s estimates assuming “a massive marketing plan aimed at Asians”
and the promise that one of the casino operators “would hire private planes
to ferry customers to the region” (quoted in Kam, 2013; see also, Spectrum
Gaming Group, 2013).
4

For an excellent example of this type of work, see, Philadelphia
Gaming Advisory Task Force (2005).
5

84

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal w Volume 18 Issue 1

